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THE "SHIELD" STATUTE: SOLUTION TO THE
NEWSMAN'S DILEMMA?
INTRODUCTION
Peter Bridge, a reporter for the now defunct Evening News of
Newark, published a revealing story of possible corruption within the
Newark Housing Authority.' The product of intensive research and
investigation, the story relied to a large extent upon information re-
ceived from one of the Authority's members who claimed a bribe had
been offered her in an attempt to influence the vote in the election of
the board's new executive director. Public indignation was aroused,
prompting an official investigation. In the ensuing grand jury inquiry,
Bridge was required to testify. Although he responded to the majority
of the questions asked of him, Bridge declined to answer a few of the
jury's interrogatories. Relying on an alleged newsman's privilege allow-
ing a reporter to refuse to answer questions which would reveal the
source of the newsman's information, Bridge refused to answer certain
questions which he felt went beyond the authority of the jury and which,
more precisely, would have destroyed his effectiveness as an investiga-
tive news reporter.' Answers to these inquiries would have revealed
unpublished research and the confidential sources of his investigation.
As a consequence, those sources and sources yet untapped would have
disappeared.'
For his action Peter Bridge was incarcerated in the Essex County
Jail in Newark. Though his stay behind bars lasted only 20 days, it was
clear from the contempt citation that his time there could have been
indefinitely longer if the grand jury's term had not expired.4
Recently, many members of the news media have been forced ei-
ther to suffer similar penalties or to flee from their home states to avoid
such punishment.' This note examines the urgent need for adequate
statutory protections which would limit the instances in which a news-
man must disclose his confidential sources and the corresponding treat-
I. In re Bridge, 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972).
2. See Indianapolis Star, Oct. 25, 1972, at 18; for a more detailed treatment of Mr. Bridge's
philosophy, see Bridge, Peter Bridge: A Reporter Protects His Sources, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 29,
1972. § IA (Perspective), at 3 [hereinafter cited as Bridge].
3. Bridge, supra note 2.
4. See Indianapolis Star, supra note 2.
5. See Landau, Enough "Blood" Now In Newsmen's Fight, Indianapolis Star, Nov. 23,
1972, at 40; see also NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1972, at 60, col. 2.
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ment such legislation may encounter from a judiciary which seems de-
termined to scrutinize this legislation on a highly technical basis.
THE PRIVILEGE: A BRIEF HISTORY
The Non-existent Privilege
It should be noted at the outset that the evidentiary privilege
claimed by Peter Bridge and his fellow journalists exists only in the
canon of ethics espoused by the news media.' As pointed out by legal
scholars, no such privilege existed at the common law,8 and efforts to
construct such a privilege under the provisions of the first amendment
have failed for the most part.9
The Constitutional Exclusion
Though a myriad of legal writers have debated the existence of a
journalistic privilege under the first amendment'0 and the news media
has generally assumed that such a privilege existed as an integral ele-
ment of freedom of the press, the Supreme Court, in Branzburg v.
Hayes," recently settled the debates and disposed of any constitutional
basis for the media's assumptions. Because of this decision, it is now
quite clear that newsmen have no first amendment privilege to withhold
the identities of their news sources when such disclosure is demanded
in judicial, legislative or administrative hearings. 2
THE STATUTORY ANSWER: THE "SHIELD" STATUTE
With only certain constitutional and common law" exceptions,
6. Definitional problems for such terms as "source," newsman," "newspaper," etc. are not
treated within the scope of this note.
7. See Guest and Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their
Sources, 64 Nw. L. REV. 18 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Guest and Stanzler]. Therein the following
is noted:
In 1934 the American Newspaper Guild adopted the following as part of the news-
man's code of ethics: "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal confidences or disclose
sources of confidential information in court or before other judicial or investigating bod-
ies."
BIRD AND MERWIN, THE NEWSPAPER AND SOCIETY 567 (1942).
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2286 (McNaughton ed. 1961).
9. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77, at 159 (Cleary ed. 1972).
10. For one of the better treatments of the constitutional debate, see Guest and Stanzler,
supra note 7.
II. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
12. Id.
13. E.g., the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
14. E.g., the husband-wife and attorney-client privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications.
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it is clear that the judiciary has the power to compel the testimony of
witnesses.'" Similar powers have been extended to grand jury investiga-
tions;"6 it is primarily this extension which most alarms the reporting
industry since, under normal grand jury proceedings, witnesses are not
allowed counsel and the questions are as "wideranging and freewheeling
as the District Attorney and the individual jurors choose to make
them." 7
Since constitutional avenues are now closed, any semblance of an
evidentiary privilege for newsmen must come from the state and federal
legislatures where, on the basis of regular debate and a "full considera-
tion of competing values," a decision may validly be made." Such a
determination should not be left to the courts but to the legislatures. 9
Indeed, despite the negative aspects of the Court's decision in
Hayes,1° a certain elasticity was evident which may yet afford recogni-
tion of the privilege espoused by the news media. In this respect the
Court acknowledged the authority of the state and federal lawmakers
to "fashion their own [evidentiary] standards."'" Consequently, legisla-
tive creativity could institute a valuable privileged status for newsmen
through the establishment of "shield" statutes. Such statutes, currently
possessed in some degree by at least 17 states,22 would limit the condi-
tions under which a journalist could be forced to reveal his confidential
news sources. It is submitted that such statutory protection, absent the
protection of the first amendment and in view of the recent deluge of
subpoenas demanding testimonial disclosures by newsmen,23 is vitally
necessary to preserve the value and effectiveness of a free press.
15. Guest and Stanzler, supra note 7, at 24-25.
16. Id.
17. Brief for Petitioner at 29, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
19. Id.
20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21. Id. at 706.
22. ALA. CODE RECOMPILED tit. 7, § 370 (1960); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150 (1971 Cum.
Supp.); ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (Supp. 1972-73); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1964);
CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 421.100 (1969); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 45.1451-54 (Cum. Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2
(1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945 (I) (1954); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. tit. 93, ch. 601-2 (1964);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 48.087 (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1972-73); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1970); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1972-73); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2739.12 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330(a) (Supp. 1972-73).
23. See Nelson, The Newsman's Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and
Information, 24 VAND. L. REV. 667 (1970). See also Note, The Newsman's Privilege: Govern-
ment Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Investigations], where the writer notes that especially since 1969, the increase
1973]
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Beneficiaries of a Shield Statute
One journalist has observed that the primary beneficiary of a shield
statute would be the public rather than the reporter:24
The justification for a shield law is in protection of the public's
right of access to a free flow of information about the actions
of government and other matters of vital public concern. Very
often the only way to get certain kinds of information, about
criminal acts or corruption in government, for example-is to
get it from persons who will reveal the information only if they
can do so without being identified.
Thus, forcing a reporter to reveal his confidential sources
will cause those sources to disappear. The public will be de-
prived of the information such sources could provide.25
This contention, which aptly summarizes the views of the media, is
similar to that propounded by counsel in a recent newsman's appeal
before the Supreme Court.26 Both views clearly underscored the need for
protective legislation to sustain the press as a vibrant and effective
source of information. 7
LEGISLATIVE INTENT VERSUS A CRIPPLING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
As previously noted, at least 17 states have responded to media
pleas.28 In addition, at least 24 proposals are presently before the United
States Congress in an effort to implement a federal shield statute.29
Although the trend seems favorable for a statutory creation of a journal-
istic privilege, any legislation thus produced faces a judiciary which has
chosen to construe the scope and effect of existing legislation along
narrow boundaries and has rendered most shield statutes virtually impo-
in subpoenas issued to members of the news media has steadily eroded what privilege the profession
may once have had.
24. Indianapolis Star, Dec. 20, 1972, (Editorial), at 32, col. I.
25. Id.
26. Brief for Petitioner at 29, In re Pappas, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
27. See generally Investigations, supra note 22. See also Thomas, Press Freedom Is Your
Cause. Too, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1973, § I (Perspective), at 10. For an indication of public
opinion in regard to the newsman's dilemma, see infra note 78.
28. See note 22 supra.
29. NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1973, at 60, col. 3. For examples of similar legislation which failed
in the recent past, see: H.R. 16704, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); H.R. 16328, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
(1970); S. 3552, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 1311, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
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tent. Most past legislative efforts to extend an evidentiary privilege to
newsmen thereby seem to have been thwarted. 0
One writer, in commenting upon Indiana's shield statute3 (yet to
be fully tested in court), observed that the Indiana General Assembly,
by enacting the statutory shield, clearly preferred the policy of protect-
ing newsmen in order to insure full disclosure of information to the
public to that of endangering the identities of the news media's sources
in any inquisitional hearing. 2 It is contended that such is the intent and
preference of all legislative bodies in establishing their respective eviden-
tiary protections.
A Matter of Interpretation
Though there is a paucity of case law dealing with existing shield
statutes, the restrictive approach of most tribunals illustrates the extent
to which a judge-made doctrine33 of strict construction has become
entrenched in the majority of jurisdictions. 4 A deeply ingrained opin-
ion that newsmen are to enjoy little or no evidentiary privilege has taken
such a firm grasp on the majority of courts that "even legislative fiat is
not . . . successful in extirpating it."3"
For the most part, it seems that the judiciary has ignored the
30. See Comment, Newsman's Privilege-Statute Held to Prevent Forced Disclosure of
Documents and Other Materials, 39 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 489 (1964).
31. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1733 (1968):
Newspapers, television, and radio stations-Press associations-Employees and repre-
sentatives-Immunity.
Any person connected with a weekly, semiweekly, triweekly or daily newspaper that
conforms to postal regulations, which shall have been published for five [5] consecutive
years in the same city or town and which has a paid circulation of two per cent [2%] of
the population of the county in which it is published, or a recognized press association,
as a bona fide owner, editorial or reportorial employee, who receives his or her principal
income from legitimate gathering, writing, editing, and interpretation of news, and any
person connected with a commercially licensed radio or television station as owner, offi-
cial, or as an editorial or reportorial employee who receives his or her principal income
from legitimate gathering, writing, editing, interpreting, announcing or broadcasting of
news, shall not be compelled to disclose in any legal proceedings or elsewhere the source
of any information procured or obtained in the course of his employment or representation
of such newspaper, press association, radio station or television station, whether published
or not published in the newspaper or by the press association or broadcast or not broadcast
by the radio or television station by which he is employed.
32. Note, Testimonial Privilege and Competency in Indiana, 27 IND. L.J. 256, 271 (1952).
33. Comment, Caldwell v. United States-Journalistic Privilege: A New Dimension to Free-
dona of the Press, 37 BROOKLYN L. REv. 502, 509 (1971).
34. Id.
35. Id.
19731
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legislative mandate. Utilizing the fact that no journalistic privilege ex-
isted at the common law,3" the courts have rationalized a series of
decisions on the following basis:
The critical attitude which the courts . ..have taken serves
. . .to emphasize the rule of. . .[statutory] construction that
statutes in derogation of common law rights are to be strictly
construed and that courts are not to infer that the legislature
intended to alter the common law principles further than is
clearly expressed or than the case absolutely requires. 7
A federal court used this rationale, for example, to construe the Califor-
nia shield statute.18 The court declared that a reporter for the late Look
magazine could not invoke the evidentiary advantages afforded by the
statute because of the failure of the word "magazine" to appear explic-
itly within the provisions of the statute. 9 This desire for undue preci-
sion on the part of the court, if universally followed, seems certain to
produce unfavorable results for such news gathering publications as
Time, Newsweek, U.S. News and World Report, and the like.40
In Branzburg v. Pound,4 the Kentucky Court of Appeals effec-
tively avoided the provisions of what has been described as an "abso-
lute"42 shield statute 3 in finding that a reporter, by personally observ-
36. See note 8 supra.
37. State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 486, 30 A.2d 421, 426 (1943).
38. Cepeda v. Cohane, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D. N.Y. 1964).
39. CAL. EVID. CODE ANN. § 1070 (West 1966):
A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or employed upon a
newspaper, or by a press association or wire service, cannot be adjudged in contempt by
a court, the Legislature, or any administrative body, for refusing to disclose the source of
any information procured for publication and published in a newspaper.
Nor can a radio or television news reporter or other person connected with or em-
ployed by a radio or television station be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured for and used for news or news commentary
purposes on radio or television.
40. See generally TIME, Oct. 16, 1972, at 44.
41. 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ct. App. Ky. 1970), aff'd, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
42. See D'Alemberte, Journalists Under the Axe: Protection of Confidential Sources of
Information, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. 307, 328 (1969) [hereinafter cited as D'Alemberte].
43. Ky. REV. STAT. § 421.100 (1969):
Newspaper, radio or television broadcasting station personnel need not disclose source of
information.
No person shall be compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial before any
court, or before any grand or petit jury, or before the presiding officer of any tribunal, or
his agent or agents, or before the General Assembly, or any committee thereof, or before
any city or county legislative body, or any committee thereof, or elsewhere, the source of
any information procured or obtained by him, and published in a newspaper or by a radio
[Vol. 7
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ing a group of persons manufacturing illegal drugs, became the source
of the information published. The court stated that, since the source was
clearly identified, there remained no reason to invoke the privilege of
source concealment afforded by the state legislature. The intent to cre-
ate the privilege must be clear, announced the court, before the bench
would recognize an immunity that did not exist at the common law."
Utilizing the rationale of Pound, the Maryland Court of Appeals
construed the Maryland shield statute in a like manner.4 In Lightman
v. State,46 a case involving a factual situation similar to Pound, the court
held that a newsman who personally observed the selling and exchange
of marijuana had no statutory privilege to conceal the identity of the
owner of the premises even though the latter may have been the re-
porter's confidential source of information. 7
Another construction problem, involving a supposedly "absolute ' 48
shield statute,49 occurred in State v. Donovan 0 where a New Jersey
or television broadcasting station by which he is engaged or employed, or with which he
is connected.
44. 461 S.W.2d at 347.
45. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 2 (1971):
Employees on newspapers or for radio or television stations cannot be compelled to
disclose source of news or information.
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on a newspaper or journal or for
any radio or television station shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceeding or
trial or before any committee of the legislature or elsewhere, the source of any news or
information procured or obtained by him for and published in the newspaper or dissemi-
nated by the radio or television station on and in which he is engaged, connected with or
employed.
46. 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 149 (Ct. Spec. App. 1972), aff'd, 295 A.2d 212 (Ct. App.
1972).
47. This possibility was also recognized in Pound where the court conceded that the case
was complicated in that in all probability the person the reporter observed manufacturing the drugs
was also the reporter's confidential informant. Still, the court ignored the statute and required the
reporter to testify. 461 S.W.2d at 348. Accord, State v. Sheridan, 248 Md. 320, 236 A.2d 18 (Ct.
App. 1967) (dictum).
48. See D'Alemberte, supra note 42, at 329.
49. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1972):
Newspaperman's privilege.
Rule 27.
Subject to Rule 37 [§ 2A: 84A-29], a person engaged on, connected with, or em-
ployed by, a newspaper has a privilege to refuse to disclose the source, author, means,
agency or person from or through whom any information published in such newspaper
was procured, obtained, supplied, furnished, or delivered.
Rule 37.
A person waives his right or privilege to refuse to disclose or to prevent another from
disclosing a specified matter if he or any other person while the holder thereof has (a)
contracted with anyone not to claim the right or privilege or, (b) without coercion and
with knowledge of his right or privilege, made disclosure of any part of the privileged
matter or consented to such a disclosure made by anyone.
et al.: The "Shield" Statute: Solution to the Newsman's Dilemma?
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1973
242 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
court technically construed the statute to exclude the messengers of
confidential information. Shortly after the verdict was rendered, in re-
sponse to what it obviously considered an unwarranted intrusion into
lawmaking, the state legislature amended its shield statute to include
those messengers specifically.5 However, 30 years later in the case of
In re Bridge,"2 the appellate court of that same state once again ignored
legislative guidelines. In response to the court's decision, the New Jersey
legislature took immediate steps to strengthen further the provisions of
its supposed "absolute" shield statute53 weakened by repetitive assaults
from a judiciary too mechanical in its approach. 4 By taking such action,
the lawmakers clearly indicated their displeasure with the court's appar-
ent ignorance and continued misinterpretation of legislative intent.
Libel and the Shield Statute
As the state with the greatest number of cases interpreting a shield
statute, New Jersey has demonstrated the narrow approach utilized by
most courts in determining the scope of protection offered by a shield
statute. Two cases, Brogan v. Passaic Daily News5 and Beecroft v.
Point Pleasant Publishing Co.,"6 illustrate that narrow approach. Both
cases involved libel actions in which the newspapers refused to disclose
the source of allegedly libelous material. The defense raised was that the
material was published in "good faith" and that the underlying sources
were "reliable." In both cases the courts deemed such defenses to consti-
tute a "waiver" of the statutory privilege.57 These findings were largely
based on a fear that the media would abuse its statutory privilege by
printing libelous stories if the privilege were construed to deprive the
victim of any legal recourse.58 Such an abuse is, of course, a distinct
possibility under some shield statutes, but it is doubtful that an industry-
A disclosure which is itself privileged or otherwise protected by the common law,
statutes or rules of court of this State, or by lawful contract, shall not constitute a waiver
under this section. The failure of a witness to claim a right or privilege with respect to I
question shall not operate as a waiver with respect to any other question.
50. 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943).
51. The legislative response mentioned is noted in Beecroft v. Point Pleasant Publishing Co.,
82 N.J. Super. 269, 276, 197 A.2d 416, 419 (1964). The present wording of the New Jersey statute,
quoted previously, owes its existence to the judicial interference.
52. 120 N.J. Super. 460, 295 A.2d 3 (1972).
53. See D'Alemberte, supra note 42, at 329.
54. This reaction on the part of the legislature is noted in What's News Is Privileged, TRIAL,
Sept.-Ot. 1972, at 6, col. 2.
55. 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 473 (1956).
56. 82 N.J. Super. 269, 197 A.2d 416 (1964).
57. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-21 (Supp. 1972). The statute is quoted at note 49 supra.
58. 82 N.J. Super. at 278, 197 A.2d at 420.
[Vol. 7
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wide loss of integrity will occur as a consequence of the recognition of
such an essential evidentiary privilege.
Waiver.- A Fair Evaluation
In a recent New York case, Wolf v. People,59 the court established
the criteria for invoking the statutory privilege. Therein an inmate of
the Tombs prison wrote an article in which he allegedly admitted his
criminal participation in prison rioting. After the publishers refused to
produce the manuscripts in subsequent litigation, they were cited for
contempt. On appeal, the New York Supreme Court upheld the con-
tempt charges and declared:
[11n order to raise successfully the claim of privilege, two essen-
tial elements must be established: first, the information or its
sources must be imparted to the reporter under a cloak of
confidentiality, i.e., upon an understanding, express or implied,
that the information or its sources will not be disclosed; and
second, that the information or its sources must be obtained
in the course of gathering of [sic] news for publication.
The inmate's failure to satisfy the first qualification motivated the court
to affirm the contempt citations. Such a decision seems logical since
shield statutes merely purport to protect confidential relations between
newsmen and their sources. Subsequent confidences were not in danger
of disclosure since the source of news waived his anonymity; thus, the
need for any evidentiary privilege was eliminated.
It should be noted that a shield statute need not create an insur-
mountable barrier to all litigation. Indeed, the waiver qualifications
established in Wolf seem most equitable both to the news media and to
the judicial system. While protecting the "work product" of the news-
man and the identity of his sources, the Wolf holding also predeter-
59. 69 Misc. 2d 256, 329 N.Y.S.2d 291 (Sup. Ct. 1972), aff'd, 333 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1972).
60. Id. at 261, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 297. The statute so construed was N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS § 79-
h(b) which reads as follows:
(b) Exemption of professional journalists and newscasters from contempt.
Notwithstanding the provisions of any general or specific law to the contrary, no
professional journalist or newscaster employed or otherwise associated with any newspa-
per, magazine, news agency, press association, wire service, radio or television transmis-
sion station or network, shall be adjudged in contempt by any court, the legislature or
other body having contempt powers, for refusing or failing to disclose any news or the
source of any such news coming into his possession in the course of gathering or obtaining
news for publication or to be published in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast by a
radio or television transmission station or network, by which he is professionally employed
or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity.
1973]
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mines the applicability of the shield statute in a situation where the
newsman personally witnesses an event or occurrence. Simply, when the
reporter observes a crime on a firsthand basis, without the aid of a
confidential source, his testimony could be justifiably compelled, if not
expected on a voluntary basis."
THE LIBERAL JUDICIARY
A Matter of Interpretation
Although the majority of courts tend to construe their shield stat-
utes in an overly restrictive manner, some jurisdictions have refused to
adopt such a narrow approach to the problem. A few courts have real-
ized that where "reason and experience" call for the recognition of a
privilege, the "dead hand" of the common law should not be allowed
to impede the necessary progress.62
In re Taylor 3 serves as an example of that minority view. Therein
the trial court held a reporter in contempt for refusing to produce docu-
ments (parts of which were published) which contained interviews with
his confidential source. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
overturned the contempt charges on the basis of the state's shield stat-
ute. 4 The court reasoned that, in order to realize the purpose of enacting
the statutory privilege, the confidential information should be as closely
guarded as the actual identity of the source, since the disclosure of the
information could easily lead to discovery of the informer's identity. In
explanation, the court said:
[I]f there were any doubt as to the interpretation, the Statute
must be liberally construed in favor of the newspapers and
61. See Bridge, supra note 2, at col. 4, where the author stresses the civic responsibility of
news reporters to step forward with such information.
62. Comment, Constitutional Law-Evidence-Compulsory Disclosure of Newsman's In-
formant Is Not Violative of First Amendment Or Any Testimonial Privilege, 34 NOTRE DAME
LAWYER 259, 260 (1959).
63. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
64. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 330(a) (Supp. 1972):
Confidential communications to news reporters.
No person, engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general
circulation as defined by the laws of this Commonwealth, or any press association or any
radio or television station, or any magazine of general circulation, for the purpose of
gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publishing news, shall be required to disclose
the source of any information procured or obtained by such person, in any legal proceed-
ing, trial or investigation before any court, grand jury, traverse or petit jury, or any officer
thereof, before the General Assembly or any committee thereof, before any commissioner,
department, or bureau of this Commonwealth, or before any county or municipal body,
officer, or committee thereof.
[Vol. 7
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news media. . . . [I]ndependent newspapers are today the
principal watchdogs and protectors of honest, as well as good,
Government. They are . . . the principal guardians of the gen-
eral welfare of the Community. . . .They are, in the best
sense of the maxim, "pro bono publico." 5
Such an interpretation undoubtedly promotes confidence between news-
men and informers who have information for public dissemination but
fear public exposure. A statute so construed allows the flow of news to
remain unfettered by preserving the confidentiality of the relationship
between such parties.
In accordance with Taylor is the view expressed in Ex parte
Sparrow"6 wherein the court decided that forced disclosure of a news-
man's sources in a civil action was repugnant to the purpose of the
protective statute enacted by the Alabama legislature. 7 The court an-
nounced that it was not concerned with the wisdom or prudence of the
legislature in the latter's decision to clothe the news media with an
evidentiary privilege 8 Rather, the court regarded its duty in terms of
recognizing and supporting a "crystallized" public policy as expounded
by the elected lawmakers." Clearly, the court refused to sit as a superle-
gislative body; instead it chose to enforce the established guidelines and
to give deference to the will and intent of the legislature. Though in the
minority, Sparrow and Taylor outlined the proper role for the judiciary
in the determination of a much-needed privilege for the media. Both
courts found that their legislatures, in enacting their respective shield
statutes, placed more emphasis on the protection of the news gathering
process than upon the power of fact-finding assemblies to utilize the
press as an investigatory tool.70
65. 412 Pa. at 42, 193 A.2d at 185 (emphasis added); cf In re Howard, 136 Cal. App. 2d
816, 289 P.2d 537 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
66. 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
67. ALA. CODE RECOMPILED tit. 7, § 370 (1960):
Newspaper, radio and television employees.-No person engaged in, connected with,
or employed on any newspaper (or radio broadcasting station or television station) while
engaged in a news gathering capacity shall be compelled to disclose, in any legal proceed-
ing or trial, before any court or before a grand jury of any court, or before the presiding
officer of any tribunal or his agent or agents, or before any committee of the legislature,
or elsewhere, the sources of any information procured or obtained by him and published
in the newspaper (or broadcast by any broadcasting station or televised by any television
station) on which he is engaged, connected with, or employed.
68. 14 F.R.D. at 353.
69. Id.
70. 412 Pa. at 43, 193 A.2d at 185-86. This critical observation of overzealous law enforce-
ment finds agreement in some quarters of the United States Senate as well. Senator Sam J. Ervin
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SOURCE DISCLOSURE: Two OTHER VIEWS
Ramifications: A View From the Press Box
As recognized by the minority of courts, the extension of an eviden-
tiary privilege to newsmen is not an idle gesture on the part of the
legislature. Such an extension demonstrates the realization that the free
flow of information will be curtailed unless limits are placed upon the
powers of inquisitional bodies to extract information from reporters.
However, as a consequence of the demonstrated attitude of the
majority of the judiciary, adverse ramifications have already surfaced.7
In addition to the many incidents of incarcerations for contempt, many
reporters have experienced a "drying up" of confidential information
and a subsequent loss of investigatory effectiveness.7" Some reporters
have resorted to destroying their records upon publication of their sto-
ries;7" still others have begun to avoid "the kind of story that might
cause them trouble."74 Such reactions and their consequences can only
infringe upon the public's right and need to be informed.75
Public Opinion: A Brief Synopsis
Contrary to court interpretations, the American public, in accord-
ance with the views espoused by the Taylor and Sparrow77 courts, has
expressed the opinion that a reporter should have the right to remain
silent when pressed to reveal his confidential sources.7" A recent Gallup
poll revealed that 57 percent of the American population supports the
establishment of shield statutes and the liberal interpretation thereof.79
(D-N.C.), chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, has declared that top priority
is to be given new legislation which would bolster newsmen's privileges to detour attempts "to turn
journalists into investigators" for the benefit of the courts. Indianapolis Star, Oct. 20, 1972, at 22.
71. See generally NEWSWEEK, Jan. 15, 1973, at 47, col. 2.
72. Id. This fact could have been easily predicted by William Jones, a Pulitzer Prize investi-
gative reporter for the Chicago Tribune, who could not "stress strongly enough the importance of
confidential sources" and declared anonymity to be essential. Chicago Tribune, Jan. 14, 1973, § 2
(Perspective), at 4, col. I.
73. See generally NEWSWEEK, supra note 71.
74. Thomas, Press Freedom Is Your Cause, Too, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 13, 1973, § I
(Perspective), at 10, col. 3.
75. Id.; see also note 71 supra.
76. 412 Pa. 32, 193 A.2d 181 (1963).
77. 14 F.R.D. 351 (N.D. Ala. 1953).
78. See Gallup, Majority Favors Reporter Right To Stay Silent, Indianapolis Star, Dec. 3,
1972, § I, at 18, col. 1.
79. Id. The Gallup poll and its results were based on personal interviews with over 1,400
adults in over 300 scientifically selected locations. The question posed was:
Suppose a newspaper reporter obtains information for a news article he is writing
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THE NEWSMAN'S DILEMMA
Seemingly, the public has observed that the judiciary, by its restrictive
interpretation of shield statutes, has contravened legislative mandates
and has taken upon itself the functions and duties of a superlegislature.
In so doing, most courts have deprived the public of an essential avenue
of information.80
CONCLUSION
It should be evident at this point that shield statutes have done little
to solve the newsman's dilemma. Though some specific shield statutes
may, on their face, fall short of providing adequate protection to the
media, it seems clear that the major inadequacies are due primarily to
a judiciary which has thus far ignored, or at least failed to observe, the
import of the news media's plight.
Although the drafting of a model shield statute might be helpful in
alleviating the newsman's dilemma, it is contended that a number of
seemingly adequate statutes already exist but are hampered in vitality
by a judiciary resigned to a doctrine of strict construction. Still, a statute
enacted by the United States Congress which would compel source
disclosures only under limited circumstances8 would "insure the pub-
lic's right to know by legislatively shoring up the rights the First Amend-
ment was intended to protect."82
Despite the efforts of a substantial number of state legislatures, it
seems clear that attempts to afford adequate evidentiary protection to
the news media have fallen far short of intended results. State shield
statutes, even those considered absolute in their provisions, have proven
to be, for the most part, inadequate.8 3
from a person who asks that his name be withheld. Do you think that the reporter should
or should not be required to reveal the name of his man if he is taken to court to testify
about the information in his article?
Percentiles on responses to the question were as follows:
Should Should Not
National 34% 57%
College Background 27% 68%
High School 37% 55%
Grade School 35% 48%
80. See generally note 74 supra.
81. Guidance for such a statute may well be found in guidelines drafted by former Attorney
General John Mitchell for government issuance of subpoenas to members of the news media in
1969. Among the provisions were requirements that: (I) the material sought must be absolutely
essential to the case; (2) the subpoena be specific and limited; and (3) possible alternative sources
of the information, other than those of the newsman, be first exhausted. Fighter For A Free Press,
Chicago Tribune, Oct. 18, 1972, (Editorial), at 16, col. I.
82. Securing Press Freedom, Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 27, 1973, (Editorial), at 25, col. 1.
83. Id.
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Whether a shield statute will be enacted at the federal level depends
upon legislative recognition of the ultimate impact of the newsman's
plight-a severe infringement upon the public's right to know. Whether
existing shield statutes can be strengthened to correspond to original
legislative intentions seems to depend upon a judicial re-examination of
the value of a truly free press in a democratic society. The public has
expressed its desire to protect the media by means of a pervasive shield
statute.84 It remains for the courts to respond to such a prevalent desire
in order to afford any such legislation, federal or state, its full legal
significance.
84. See note 78 supra.
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